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1 Introduction
Who interacts with whom in local taxation? Local governments have several motives to
set tax rates with respect to neighboring jurisdictions. In particular, local tax choices
of neighboring jurisdictions might be a subject of competition for mobile tax bases, a
benchmark or even a learning device for local politicians. However, it is not clear to whom
local politicians refer in their tax policies, i.e. who are their effective neighbors for local
tax mimicking. In particular, we investigate which channels particularly matter local
tax interactions, for e.g. we ask whether institutional proximity intensifies interactions
compared to pure geographical distance. Understanding the exact nature of local tax
interactions is important for the implications of the spatial distribution of income in
the long run. Moreover, a benevolent social planner should harmonize taxes if local
tax interactions are motivated by a harmful competition over mobile resources in a race
to the bottom style and rather follow a laissez-faire policy if taxes rate strategies are
communicated between local governments and no tax base effects are present.
Traditional empirical studies on tax rate interactions typically define neighbors as a
(weighted) average of neighboring jurisdictions.1. However, local governments in most
federations are strongly interrelated with respect to the institutions they share both
horizontally (e.g. joint administration bodies like courts or tax offices) and vertically,
for example in overlapping jurisdictions like counties and municipalities. Therefore, local
politicians might have different social or professional ties to other local decision makers.
Based on this, tax interactions might be stronger in settings where local politicians or
bureaucrats interact more intensely with each other rather than only with geographically
close jurisdictions. Our contribution is to provide evidence on the importance of several
coordination channels for tax interactions. In particular, we intend to show that local
institutions and media via an inherent information transfer might be more important
than pure geographical criteria for the significance of local tax interactions.
We use detailed geocoded data from local networks of institutions and media coverage
to construct neighbor matrices consisting of municipalities sharing the same institutions
as well as geographically close municipalities to identify local tax interactions. Weight-
ing matrices usually assign the average values of the neighboring tax rates, which are
1Geographical distance is either measured by the adjacency of neighbors, the N nearest
number of neighbors or the inverse distance between two jurisdictions. See Revelli (2005) for a
review.
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in our setting institutional or geographical neighbors. Our setting is particularly inter-
esting as potential vertical externalities from higher tier institutions which are shared
with other local governments are unlikely as we focus on institutions with no own tax
autonomy rights. Therefore, institutions function as a coordination device of political
actions and not as a competitor for local tax bases. Using this we are able to separate
the coordination effect of institutions from their potentially depriving effects on common
tax bases. Moreover, NRW is interesting for institutional coordination effects as it is de-
scribed as the most professionalized state in Germany regarding local political decision
making (Arnold, Boettcher, Freier, Geißler, and Holler, 2015).
To identify local tax mimicking, we use a policy reform of local fiscal equalization in
the German state of NRW as a quasi-experimental setting that created an incentive
for municipalities to increase their tax rates. We construct an instrumental variable
that predicts reform incentives to increase tax rates for neighboring municipalities by
constructing the so called predicted imposed increase in tax rates (Lyytikäinen, 2012).
Using this policy reform in the commonly applied spatial lag IV estimation, we yield
three main findings for business tax rates in NRW.
Using counties as our baseline weighting matrix, first, we find, positive significant tax rate
interactions. Moreover, shared administration services and common access to local media
yield similar results. However, interactions with geographical neighbors are not significant
in our setting which contrasts most of the traditional literature. Unlike geographical
neighbors, political and social proximity might be asymmetric in distance and adjacency.
Even though geographical neighbors are more likely to be in the same institution, political
and social proximity weights might be asymmetric in distance and adjacency to their
geographical counterparts, for e.g. with neighboring municipalities in different counties
or across intermunicipal cooperations. Therefore, we find that some institutions indeed
elevate tax rate interactions when there are in fact no interactions over geographical
distance.
Second, there are positive and significant tax interactions during the reform. However,
significant effects phase out already two years after the reform. Therefore, tax interactions
are not a general phenomenon but only reform-induced in the present study.2
2Changes in tax rates are often only triggered by reforms of local fiscal equalization (Baskaran,
2014), changes in minimum tax rates (Lyytikäinen, 2012), integration of new regions into a
federation (Baskaran, 2015b) or election dates (Foremny and Riedel, 2014).
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Third, we find suggestive evidence for local tax interactions via social learning processes
through institutions and common local media. Several reasons provide evidence for a
learning process. For instance, tax interactions are short-lived, which provides supportive
evidence for a one-time learning process rather than continuous tax interactions. In
addition, interaction is strongest when common institutions are considered as a neighbor
framework. In fact, institutions where local politicians and bureaucrats can be thought
to be the most interactive with each other, namely within the same county and the same
administrations. Therefore, counties, joint administrations as well as local media are
effective coordination mechanisms for local tax policies during the reform. However, other
channels like inter-municipal cooperation in individual projects or regional marketing and
tourism as well as interest group coverage do not intensify tax interactions.
We also argue that other forms of tax mimicking are unlikely in our setting.3 We rule
out tax rate interactions via tax competition due to the absence of tax base effects of
neighboring tax rate changes during the reform, interactions through institutions being
stronger than geographical criteria and the short term adjustment during the reform.
Additionally, we rule out yardstick competition because it implies that municipalities
with majorities have less intensely interactions than those without. We do not find
evidence for this. Moreover, a subtle change in local fiscal equalization might also not
be visible or important to voters even though the impact on local tax rates is strong.
Although we find media to be an important transmission channel for local tax interactions
(Revelli, 2008), there seems to be no voter effect of local media but rather a coordination
of local decision makers via media over issues like local tax policies. Furthermore, benefit
spillovers are unlikely in the present context as there is no negative interaction effect.
Our findings are consistent with recent quasi-experimental evidence that local tax rate
interactions are not a general phenomenon (Baskaran, 2014; Lyytikäinen, 2012; Isen,
2014; Eugster and Parchet, 2011).4 In particular, we show that there are significant
tax rate interactions but that they are only short-lived and not relevant in the common
3See Section 2 for a detailed overview of theoretical motives on local tax interactions.
4Agrawal (2015a) finds horizontal and vertical interactions via local sales tax rates for states in
the US by taking state border discontinuities into account. Agrawal (2015b) exploits state border
discontinuities to show interaction among local sales tax rates at state borders. Eugster and
Parchet (2011) find small scale tax competition effects of the local income tax in Switzerland along
cultural borders. Parchet (2012) finds that personal income tax rates are strategic substitutes
in Switzerland. Holzmann and Schwerin (2015) find tax rate interactions in a highly integrated
economic area. (Traditional) studies not using quasi-experimental methods to identify tax rate
interactions also find strong tax rate interactions; for a survey see Allers and Elhorst (2005).
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adjacent neighbor definitions but rather arise within certain channels.
We contribute to the literature on who competes with whom in tax policy. We explicitly
distinguish institutional and geographical distance using detailed information on differ-
ent local institutions, for example administration and cooperation, media, and standard
geographical criteria. Hence, we are among the first to show that institutions also matter
in local tax interactions. Revelli (2003) and Agrawal (2015a), however, show that vertical
interactions matter in local taxation for British and US local governments, respectively.
We find evidence for the relevance of counties for interactions of local fiscal policy in a
multi-tier federation (Borck, Fossen, Freier, and Martin, 2015; Agrawal, 2015a; Buettner,
2001; Büttner and von Schwerin, forthcoming).
Moreover, we add to a small literature which defines factors that determine tax inter-
actions like cultural borders (Eugster and Parchet, 2011), integration of economic areas
(Holzmann and Schwerin, 2015; Baskaran, 2014) or regions (Baskaran, 2015b), metropoli-
tan areas versus periphery (Brueckner and Saavedra, 2001; Kauder, 2014; Charlot and
Paty, 2010; Koh, Riedel, and Böhm, 2013), and borders for both states (Geys and Os-
terloh, 2013; Cassette, Porto, and Foremny, 2012; Baskaran, 2014; Agrawal, 2015b) or
nations (Cassette, Porto, and Foremny, 2012), respectively.5
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe several motives for local tax
interactions. Section 3 outlines the institutional framework, most notably the system of
local fiscal equalization of NRW and its reform in 2003. Section 4 and 5 describe the
empirical approach and results, respectively. Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical motives for local tax interactions
Local governments can have several motives to interact in tax rates. An important one
is certainly discussed in the tax competition literature, where local jurisdictions try to
attract a mobile capital tax base by setting lower tax rates (Wilson, 1999; Zodrow and
Mieszkowski, 1986). Tax rates become interdependent as the tax reduction of one ju-
risdiction lets others experience a fiscal externality in form of an outflow of capital. In
5Moreover, Reiter (2015) provides a survey on the question of who competes with whom in
international tax competition. In a centre-periphery framework, Janeba and Osterloh (2013)
show that metropolitan and rural jurisdictions compete sequentially over mobile tax bases.
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a symmetric setting, tax competition results in a harmful race to the bottom. How-
ever, asymmetries in the assumptions of the model can make the sign of tax interde-
pendence ambiguous. Secondly, jurisdictions might experience informational spillovers
in tax choices when comparing themselves to neighboring units as yardsticks (Besley and
Case, 1995). Here, voters can use tax rates of other municipalities ceteris paribus as
a benchmark to determine how successful the respective incumbent is and accordingly,
either punish or reward him at the polls. Thus, in order to get re-elected local politicians
might mimic tax choices of neighboring places. Therefore, one would expect positive tax
interactions in the presence of yardstick competition. However, a prominent reason for
negative tax interactions are benefit spillovers (Case, Rosen, and Hines, 1993). The idea
is that local public goods provision in a given municipality entails positive externalities
in other units due to the non-excludable character of quasi-public club goods. Hence,
spending needs of the neighboring jurisdictions are lower and allow for lower tax rates.
Beside these traditional theories of local tax interactions, the literature has recently
discussed other transmission channels of tax rate mimicking. Potentially relevant to our
setting are especially interactions through social learning or (partial) tax coordination.
For instance, Glick (2014) sets up a model where social learning can overcome situa-
tions with substantial uncertainty about policy outcomes such as policy reforms. Thus,
learning from others' tax choices with limited information of policy makers on the con-
sequences of one's own tax rate decisions can be efficient. Accordingly, tax mimicking
should constitute a positive sign if social learning or knowledge diffusion is present. More-
over, Becker and Davies (2013) show that tax mimicking via social learning is lower if
adjustment costs are present. For example intensive communication of local governments
might lower adjustment costs between policy makers and can elevate tax interactions.
There are also incentives to coordinate local tax choices as competing over a mobile tax
base might lead to an inefficient underprovision of public goods. Whereas most of the
literature discusses difficulties of jurisdictions to coordinate their tax choices (Keen and
Konrad, 2012), we believe that multi-tier federations like Germany indeed offer scenar-
ios in which coordination might be effective. For instance, institutions (like counties)
and joint administration (bureaucracy) shared by multiple municipalities might provide
a platform for knowledge diffusion with respect to tax strategies or even actively provide
guidelines for setting tax rates. Given coordination, one would expect perfect harmoniza-
tion of tax rates within that specific area of coordination. In the presence of asymmetries
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of regions, however, one would not expect identical tax rates as some municipalities might
be harmed by coordination (Kanbur and Keen, 1993). However, strong institutions like
counties might potentially initiate coordination if their members are sufficiently similar.
Partial tax coordination takes place in similar regions if tax competition takes place
repeatedly (Cardarelli, Taugourdeau, and Vidal, 2002; Cotenaro and Vidal, 2006). With
partial coordination, groups of similar jurisdictions compete over resources with other
regions and yield harmonized tax rates just as with with social learning. For example,
jurisdictions belonging to the same county or particularly similar or close neighborhoods
within the same county might entail sufficient homogeneity of municipalities for partial
tax coordination to take place. Note that partial coordination implies a fiscal externality
(between similar regions) unlike tax harmonization or social learning.
3 Institutions
3.1 Local governments and public bodies in Germany
In the present paper we want to show the relevance of learning across different institutions
for local tax interactions in the German federal state of NRW. German local governments
display a high degree of fragmentation and heterogeneity. Generally one can distinguish
jurisdictions and non-jurisdictional bodies, each with substantial differences in terms of
autonomy and accountability.6
Jurisdictions are constitutionally recognized units with own territories and directly elected
representatives. There are many jurisdictions in Germany, such as states (2011: 16),
counties (295), and municipalities (11,442). NRW is the most populous state in Ger-
many with about 17.6 Million residents and 396 municipalities, including 30 counties
and 23 district-free cities. Local governments are usually part of several jurisdictions
in a multi-tier federation like Germany. Municipalities, for example, belong to a certain
county and state. Below state-level all local governments are subject to the constitutional
right of self-governance (Article 26 II Grundgesetz). Like in other countries, municipali-
ties offer several local public goods such as general administration, infrastructure, waste
6For a detailed overview of the German local government system, see Zimmermann (1999).
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disposal, and culture activities. However, municipalities also share duties with other ju-
risdictions, for example with counties or other municipalities, or even with private firms.
Municipalities have substantial spending and also some revenue autonomy (see Section
3.2). Counties, however, cooperate with municipalities in service provision. They do not
have tax autonomy and rely largely on contributions and grants.
Non-jurisdictional bodies are not legitimated by elections and also do not possess revenue
autonomy, i.e. they do not have taxation rights. NRW for instance, has semi-autonomous
bodies like regional districts (Regierungsbezirke), which are administrative districts of
the state government, and various general or single purpose inter-municipal cooperations.
Cooperations in administration or local economy issues are initiated locally and represent
horizontal cooperation. They usually serve to exploit economies of scale or increase
bargaining power in political issues. Regional districts, however, follow a classical top-
down model of bureaucracy and are a typical example of local institutions which do not
pass legislation but implement arm's length decisions from the state.
In this study, we exploit information on institutions which could either elevate horizontal
or vertical tax interactions at the municipal level. Vertical tax interactions refer to the
coordination of tax policies by (or passively in the area of) a higher tier of government,
for example within a county or regional district. Jurisdictions might also interact hori-
zontally with other units from the same tier, for example between municipalities. Local
governments might also be influenced by non-governmental interest groups. Economic,
political or cultural associations might lobby for certain policies at the local level.
3.2 Local business taxation
Municipalities can set the tax rate for the business and property tax autonomously. In
fact, the business tax (Gewerbesteuer) is the most important source of local revenues
under own discretion in Germany. Municipalities in NRW earn on average 18-24% of
their overall revenues from business taxes. Note that the municipalities can only levy
a business tax multiplier τi, but as it is applied to the respective tax base Bi with
a percental surcharge which is fixed throughout the federation (S), the tax multiplier
actually represents the effective tax rate7:
7Therefore, we use the terms tax rate and tax rate multiplier interchangeably.
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Ti = τi · S ·Bi (1)
where Ti is the business tax revenue of a given municipality i. The surcharge S (Steuer-
messzahl) is fixed and equals 3.5% since a corporate tax reform in 2008 (Büttner, Schef-
fler, and von Schwerin, 2014). 8 Business taxes are levied by a municipality on all firms
located in that municipality. The respective tax base is the firms' net profits (Gewer-
beertrag), although there are some exceptions.9.
Municipalities can also tax housing and land property within their borders. The tax base
is the assessed value determined by the respective local tax office. There are separate
property taxes for agricultural (Grundsteuer A) and both residential and commercial
usage (Grundsteuer B). Overall, property taxation is less important to German munic-
ipalities than income from business tax. Note that we focus in the following on the
business tax.
However, municipalities also receive income from taxes which are shared vertically across
governmental tiers (Gemeinschaftssteuern). Note that shared income taxes and VAT in-
come accounted for about 19.34% and 1.84% of municipal revenues in NRW, respectively.
Although municipalities receive certain shares of tax revenues from related economic ac-
tivities within their borders, they do not possess tax autonomy on these taxes.
3.3 Local fiscal equalization and its reform in 2003
The present paper exploits a reform in local fiscal equalization in NRW in 2003 to study
its effect on local tax interactions and related transmission channels. Indeed, the single
most important source of local revenues are transfers from the state government, pro-
vided within a local fiscal equalization scheme. They account for about 50% of overall
8Before, the surcharge depended on the business type of the firm with incorporated and most
non-incorporated firms facing a 5% surcharge rate. Non-incorporated companies like private
business partnerships faced a maximum rate of 5% when taxable income for business tax exceeded
48,000 euro and a minimum rate of 1% when earnings were below 12,000 euro.
9For instance, local business tax payments can be deducted from either personal income or
corporate income tax, for non-incorporated and incorporated companies, respectively (Büttner,
Scheer, and von Schwerin, 2014)
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municipal revenues in NRW. Whereas grants can be either discretionary10 or rule-based
(Schlüsselzuweisungen), the latter are within the focus of this paper as they are econom-
ically more important and are also subject to our natural experiment.
Rule-based transfers from the federal state target on giving municipalities sufficient funds
to provide local public goods in an sufficient quantity and quality. Fiscal equalization
mainly intends to balance out differences in municipal fiscal need and fiscal capacity
according to some formula apportionment. First, fiscal need is some benchmark level
of (obligatory) spending per inhabitant to meet citizen's needs. Second, fiscal capacity,
however, is a measure of the municipal ability to finance these spending needs.11
Specifically, the rule-based transfers per capita gi,t from the federal state are distributed
to the i = 1, ..., N in order to reduce the difference between the fiscal need ni,t and the
fiscal capacity ci,t in a given year t. This fiscal equalization reads as follows
gi,t =
{
0.9(ni,t − ci,t) if ni,t > ci,t
0 else,
(2)
with 0.9 being the equalization rate in our sample period. Therefore, municipalities
with lower fiscal capacity than fiscal need will receive 90% of that fiscal gap from state
equalization transfers. With fiscal capacity at least as high as the respective need, the
municipality does not receive rule-based transfers at all (i.e. it is fiscally abundant).
Fiscal need ni,t is a standardized amount of spending fixed by the state government
(Grundbetrag) in the previous fiscal year to avoid manipulations of the assumed costs of
service provision. It is also determined by municipality-specific characteristics, mostly by
population size. Whereas all localities should receive similar revenues per capita, more
populous regions have disproportionately higher fiscal needs to compensate for assumed
higher costs of public goods provision with increasing population size (Brecht, 1932).12
The reform of fiscal equalization in 2003 leaves fiscal need unaffected but changes a
parameter referring to the fiscal capacity. Fiscal capacity is defined as the sum of tax
10Discretionary or purpose-related grants (Zweckzuweisungen) are occasional transfers from
the state-government to municipalities and are paid in form of matching grants for which mu-
nicipalities have to apply. Frequently granted transfers are for example infrastructure projects.
11For details on local fiscal equalization in German federal states, see Lenk and Rudolph (2004).
12However, also other factors like municipal centrality or the number of school children matter
(GFAG NRW, several years).
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revenues from all tax bases, i.e. from autonomously set taxes and vertically shared taxes
with no autonomy, such as VAT or federal income tax. Specifically, it is given by:
ci,t =
Ti,m,t−1
τi,m,t−1
· τt,m + Tshared,t−1, (3)
where ci,t is the fiscal capacity in the current year, Ti,m,t−1 the tax revenues for m which
denotes the three local taxes (business tax, property tax A and B) whose tax multipliers
municipalities are free to set as well as vertically shared tax revenues Tshared,t−1 from
the previous year13. Each tax base m is divided by actual tax rates τi,m,t−1 from the
previous year, respectively. Moreover, the latter term is multiplied with the so called
hypothetical tax rate τt,m (fiktiver Hebesatz ), which is set by the state government and
is constant across municipalities.
The transfer system aims at providing sufficient equality in relative fiscal power but also
does not want municipalities to rely strategically on transfer payments. Municipalities
should also engage in tax competition and therefore, the focus of fiscal capacity is shifted
from actual to potential revenues. In particular, revenues are normalized by dividing
actual revenues with tax multipliers and are then multiplied with a statewide reference
rate, i.e. the hypothetical tax rate. This procedure makes transfer payments independent
of actual tax revenues (and hence, actual tax multipliers) but instead relying on effective
tax capacity. This procedure prevents the state to perceive low-tax municipalities as
fiscally weak via mechanically lower tax revenues and vice versa for high-tax jurisdictions.
Therefore, the hypothetical tax rate should have no direct effect on transfer payments and
therefore, on actual tax rates. However, actual tax rates respond strongly and increase
as a response to an increase in the hypothetical rate in 2003 as will be shown below.
The state government of NRW increased the hypothetical multiplier for the business tax
from 380 to 403%. The same applied to the reform of hypothetical property tax rates.
NRW changes hypothetical tax rates occasionally and usually in large steps. Changes
occur when the hypothetical multiplier does not align with the (weighted) population
average of recent realized tax rates (Ministry of Interior NRW, 2010;Lenk and Rudolph
(2004)). Therefore, one might argue that some cities with large tax bases might be
13More precisely, the tax multipliers and revenues applied in the formula apportionment use
figures from July two years ago and June 30th of last year. For instance, fiscal capacity in 2003
is calculated from tax revenues between July 1st 2001 and June 30th, 2002 (GFAG NRW, 2003).
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important drivers of the level of the hypothetical tax rate. For small municipalities
which cannot individually influence the weighted average of tax rates, the policy change
is arguably exogenous. Nonetheless, we also show later that our findings are robust to
different population classes and several placebo reforms in pre-reform years. Moreover,
changes in hypothetical tax rates by the state government are irregular and come only
with little prior notice. Therefore, the timing of these reforms is hardly predictable,
especially from the viewpoint of an individual municipality.14 The reform should also
increase municipalities' tax effort and incentivizes them to rely less on fiscal grants.
Hypothetical tax rates are essentially a normalization of tax bases and there should be
no direct negative effects on transfers in equ. (2) by an increase in the hypothetical
multiplier. Thus, no significant effects on actual tax rates can be expected. A change in
the hypothetical multiplier changes the assessed fiscal capacity of all municipalities. Total
transfer payments, however, would only change if the total amount of allocated transfers
would change too or the relative fiscal gap changed. First, the state government of NRW
did not change the amount of grants from 2002 to 2003. Specifically, grants were constant
with 4.576 billion euro and 4.581 billion euro, respectively (NRW GFAG, 2002, 2003).
Therefore, fiscal need had to decrease proportionately per capita as the fiscal capacity
increased but total transfers were constant. Second, the fiscal gap could actually change
via an increase in the hypothetical multiplier but these effects on relative distribution on
transfers were minor.15 Thus, the increase in the hypothetical multiplier should not have
substantial effects on rule-based transfer payments and therefore on actual tax rates.
However, the hypothetical tax rate is a strong reference rate for actual business tax mul-
tipliers. Figure 1 shows the development of average tax rates and hypothetical tax rates
over time. Note that the increase in the hypothetical tax rate in 2003 led to an accom-
panying increase in the average business tax rate in the following years. On average, the
business tax rates are always significantly above the hypothetical tax rates and indeed
most municipalities choose a tax rate which is at least as high as the hypothetical mul-
tiplier. Moreover, the number of municipalities with tax rate changes per year increased
in 2003 substantially up to 250 out of 396.
14We provide evidence on the absence of potential anticipation effects in the robustness checks.
15An increase in the hypothetical multiplier raises the fiscal capacity for municipalities with
larger tax bases disproportionately. Hence, richer municipalities might transfer more resources
to poorer municipalities (Baskaran, 2014, 2015a). However, the respective amount should be
fairly small and thus, not have an effect on actual tax rates.
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Figure 1: Reform and Impact 2003.
Several reasons may account for this. First, the hypothetical tax rate punishes efforts
to attract a mobile tax base because a higher multiplier implies that larger tax bases
reduce transfers received in equ. (2). Thus, own tax efforts are diminished by higher
hypothetical tax rates and thus imply higher tax rates. Fiscal equalization schemes
are shown to have such effects on local tax rates both theoretically and empirically
(Kelders and Koethenbuerger, 2010; Egger, Köthenbürger, and Smart, 2010; Büttner,
2006). Holzmann and Schwerin (2015) argue that tax rates are not set too low for
another reason. Often, federal states in Germany make it a condition for municipalities
applying for a discretionary grant to make a sufficient tax effort themselves. Therefore,
if tax rates are too low municipalities might have less of a chance to receive task-related
grants from the state government. Hence, municipalities should not set their tax rates
too low below the hypothetical tax rate which is essentially a tax rate of which the state
government thinks that municipalities can tax appropriately.
Second, political economy considerations might play a role. When increasing the hypo-
thetical tax rate the state government might lower the political costs of own tax increases
by local policy-makers. They can use the veil of the state-wide tax increase to hide in-
creases in their own tax rates. Parts of the tax increase can be attributed to the state
government to avoid the loss of voter support. Moreover, Baskaran (2014) argues that
hypothetical tax rates are means for firms lobbying for lower tax rates in municipalities
if actual tax rates exceed this reference rate. Hypothetical tax rates are also important
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because of the common misbeliefs of local politicians and the local media that even a
tax rate that is negligibly lower than the hypothetical rate leads ceteris paribus to direct
losses in rule-based transfer payments (DIHK, 2009). However, fiscal capacity and there-
fore transfer payments are ceteris paribus independent from actual tax rates. Therefore,
politicians of municipalities below the reference rate might increase the respective actual
tax rate due to an increase in the hypothetical tax rate, even though no direct negative
effects on grant allocation are to be expected without it. This establishes a ratchet-effect,
where the actual tax rate should be at least as high as the hypothetical rate.
4 Methodology
4.1 Spatial lag models
This paper estimates municipal tax reactions to a change of neighboring municipalities'
tax rates. A common procedure to address this question is the spatial lag model, which
explicitly incorporates neighbor outcomes into the regression. The standard model is
estimated as follows:
τi,t = ρ
∑
j 6=i
wi,jτj,t + βxi,t + µi + i,t, (4)
where τi,t is the tax rate from municipality i in year t and τj,t represents the averaged tax
rates of all neighbor municipalities j of municipality i in period t. Moreover, significant
estimates of ρ are interpreted as strategic tax rate interactions with neighbors. We also
include xi,t as control variables, µi as municipality fixed effects and the error term i,t.
The spatial weighting matrix wi,j assigns the averaged tax rates of a pre-defined set of
neighbors. Averaging via row normalization ensures the stability of the estimator. Note
that the true weighting matrix is unknown. Traditionally, weighting matrices are either
based on common borders, distances or population weights. Generally, adjacent units or
close municipalities are assumed to have stronger interactions.
However, policy interactions might not only be triggered by geographical closeness but
also by political or social ties. To separate distinct channels of tax interactions, we
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also introduce several weighting matrices for institutional or local media networks in
addition to standard geographical weights. For instance, county membership (County) of
municipalities is an important institutional network. Moreover, we use rich institutional
data from Blotevogel, Münter, and Terfrüchte (2009) and Terfrüchte (2015) to construct
our institutional weights. We assign neighbors based on joint access to local media
(Media), administration (Administrative), municipal cooperation projects (Cooperation),
cooperation in regional marketing and tourism (Regional marketing) and interest groups
for social and economic issues (Social and economic). The definitions from Blotevogel,
Münter, and Terfrüchte (2009) follow a heuristic approach and aim to resemble given
borders. The same institutional weighting matrices are also proposed by Terfrüchte
(2015), using the regional correlation of local institutions to assign the resp borders.16
In the baseline regressions we consider all municipalities in the same county as neighbors
because of a superior model fit compared to other weighting matrices (for related Akaike
and Schwartz criteria, see Table 2) and due to the expected interactions within counties17.
Taking first differences of equ. (4) removes the municipality fixed effect µi and gives:
∆τi,t = ρ∆
∑
j 6=i
wi,jτj,t + β∆xi,t−1 + ∆i,t. (5)
Specifically, equ. (5) measures whether the change in the weighted average of neighboring
business tax rates affects the change in the business tax rates of a given municipality.
However, the neighboring tax changes ∆
∑
j 6=i
wi,jτj,t might be biased due to several sources
of endogeneity. First, there is the issue of reverse causality, i.e. whether a municipality's
tax rates influence neighbors tax rates or vice versa. Second, unobserved shocks during
the reform might influence tax rates of a certain municipality and its neighbors jointly.
For instance, this might be an exogenous reform that increases tax rates (like in our
setting) or spatially correlated macro shocks affecting both the tax base and tax rates.
16For detailed descriptions of non-geographic weighting matrices, see Appendix C and Table
C.1. The mapping of the institutions by Blotevogel, Münter, and Terfrüchte (2009) is shown in
Figure B.2 of Appendix B and the mapping of the institutions using a functional approach based
on Terfrüchte (2015) is show in Figure B.1 of Appendix B.
17We discuss the role of various institutional and geography-based weighting matrices for local
tax interactions in Section 5.4.
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There are several ways to deal with this endogeneity problem. Traditional spatial lag IV
regressions instrument the weighted average of neighboring tax rates with socioeconomic
or political characteristics of the neighboring municipalities. However, it is unlikely
that this solves potential endogeneity concerns (Gibbons and Overman, 2012).18 First,
municipal tax rates might not be well predicted by neighboring control variables because
the weighting matrix might misspecify the exact influence of neighbor characteristics
on neighboring tax rates. Second, observable neighboring control variables might have
a direct significant effect on the tax rates as well. Moreover, there might be omitted
variables that influence both the neighboring characteristics and the error term i,t.
However, recent quasi-experimental literature used exogenous variation from policy changes
to identify causal tax rate reactions at the local level. Accordingly, the next subsection
will propose an instrumental variable strategy based on a policy change in NRW to take
the endogeneity problem in the common spatial lag framework into account.19
4.2 Identification using an exogenous policy change
We use the 2003 reform in NRW to identify reactions towards neighboring tax changes us-
ing the empirical method of Lyytikäinen (2012). This paper exploits exogenous variation
from a country-wide statutory property tax increase in Finland as a natural experiment
to identify tax mimicking behavior at local level. Unlike the Finish setting, we do not
have a strictly binding minimum tax rate for business tax in NRW but municipalities
have nevertheless strong incentives to increase tax rates as a response to the increase in
the hypothetical tax rate. Hence, we believe that our instrument is relevant.
To capture the incentive to increase tax rates as a response to increased hypothetical tax
rate we calculate the predicted imposed tax increase as we cannot observe the counterfac-
tual of tax rate choices without the increase in the hypothetical rate. The update of the
hypothetical tax rate is an arguably exogenous event and hence we can use the neighbor-
ing imposed increase to predict neighboring tax changes. In other words, we instrument
tax rate choices of a municipality's neighbors with their incentives to increase tax rates.
18Another method in traditional spatial econometrics is quasi-maximum likelihood (QML)
estimation (LeSage and Pace, 2009). The underlying assumption with QML is that the true
spatial interaction is known, which is a strong assumption (Gibbons and Overman, 2012).
19We report results of traditional Spatial IV estimations in the robustness checks in Section 3.
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Therefore, we propose the calculation of neighbors' predicted imposed increases from the
reform in the first stage as follows:
∑
j 6=i
wi,jτj,2003 =
∑
j 6=i
wi,jD(τ2003,m > τj,2000,m)(τ2003,m − τj,2000,m) (6)
The term (τ2003,m − τj,2000,m) calculates the difference of the actual tax rate in 2000 to
the new hypothetical tax rate in 2003.20 First, this term gives substantial information
about the intended magnitude and probability of the tax increase as a response to the
reform. We use the year 2000 as a base year since the respective tax rate should be
a strong predictor for the tax rate in 2003, given the persistence of tax rates. Second,
the choice for the year 2000 ensures exogeneity of the instrument of the newly updated
hypothetical tax rate in 2003 because tax rates in 2000 should be uncorrelated with the
error term in equ. (5).
Furthermore, D(τ2003,m > τj,2000,m) is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the tax
rate in 2000 is below the new hypothetical tax rate in 2003. This ensures, that our
instrument only captures the local average treatment effect of municipalities which have
a positive pre-reform distance of their realized tax rates to the later standard multiplier.
This is because of the widely observed incentive of municipalities to perceive the hypo-
thetical tax rate as a minimum value for their own tax rate choices. Moreover, except for
one municipality all tax rate changes are positive. The previous discussion on municipal
incentives to use the hypothetical tax rate as a benchmark for own tax rate choices and
therefore, incentives to increase tax rates as a response to the reform in 2003, indicates
how strongly our instrument predicts tax rate increases after the reform. Moreover,
Figure 2 shows some preliminary evidence on the correlation of the predicted imposed
increase with actual tax increases due to the reform. In fact, there is a positive corre-
lation between these variables and thus, our instrument strongly predicts tax increases
from 2002 to 2003.
Note that tax rates of municipalities are spatially correlated and hence, so are the pre-
dicted imposed increases. Not taking this into account would cause endogeneity since
20Moreover, it is unlikely that in 2000 politicians already strategically reacted to the reform of
2003. Note, that the reform was only decided in late 2002. Rule-based grants are calculated on
the basis of the 1st of June 2001 until the 1st of July 2002. Therefore the year 2000 is the first
year not affected by the reform.
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Figure 2: Correlation of reform incentives and actual tax increases. Notes: The
magnitude of municipal tax rate changes are depicted with dots. Note that the size of dots represents the
frequency of certain tax rate changes in the sample.
spatial autocorrelation would feed into the error term through our instrumental variable.
By including the predicted imposed increase for a given municpality i as well we control
for the direct reform effect on this municipality. Hence, we can avoid endogeneity through
the overall incentive of the reform to increase tax rates and the related issue of spatial
autocorrelation from neighbors tax rates to own tax increases. Conditional on the own
imposed increase in a given municipality, we can measure the causal effect of tax rate
interactions of a given municipality to its neighbors in response to the tax reform.
5 Results
5.1 Data and descriptive statistics
We use a balanced panel for all 396 municipalities of NRW from 1993-2008. In the base-
line IV regressions we only exploit data from 2000 onwards as all identifying variation
for our instrument is from this period. In Section 3 we also perform placebo tests using
information from previous years starting from 1993. Data about local tax rates, popu-
lation, population structure (young and old), employment situation as well as received
overall grants21 and short- and long-term debt are obtained from the Statistical Office
21This variable contains the overall sum of transfers (discretionary plus rule-based grants).
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of NRW. The respective hypothetical tax rates are collected from laws on local fiscal
equalization from the Ministry of Interior NRW (GFAG NRW, several years).
Descriptive statistics for the main observation period between 2002 and 2003 are shown
in Table A.1 in Appendix A. The upper and lower panel show summary statistics for the
variables in levels of 2003 and in first-differences from 2002 to 2003, respectively. Business
tax rates in NRW have a large variation from 310 up to 490. Therefore, municipalities
are both below and above the hypothetical tax rate in 2003. However, more than 60%
of all municipalities change their tax rates. The change is 13.6 percentage points on
average although it ranges from -2 to 70 percentage points. Grants also vary greatly
across municipalities with a range from 0 to more than 600 euro per capita. NRW is also
a highly urbanized state with comparably high municipal debt levels.
Moreover, the left panel of Figure 3 shows the spatial distribution of business tax rates
in the year 2000. The right panel displays the distribution of related tax rate changes
during the reform. Whereas it is clear that business tax rates are generally spatially
correlated in NRW (left panel), the right panel shows that also the changes in tax rates
are clustered in space. To see whether the spatial autocorrelated tax rate changes are
the outcome of strategic interactions or only spurious correlations, we employ our spatial
lag IV estimations using the policy change in 2003 as a source of exogenous variation.
Business tax rates in 2000 Tax rate changes 2002− 2003
Figure 3: Spatial distribution of tax rates
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5.2 Baseline results
The main results using municipalities in the same county as neighbors are displayed in
Table 1. Model I gives the second stage results as depicted in equ. (5) and Model II
shows the first stage results using the instrument as outlined in equ. (6).
Table 1: Main Results
Dependent Variable: ∆τi,2003−2002
2SLS OLS
(I) (II)
Second Stage First stage
ρ 0.314**
(0.157)
Non-zero own imposed 6.403*** 1.706**
increase (1/0) (2.085) (0.690)
Own imposed increase 0.176** 0.000
(0.089) (0.020)
∆Populationi,2002−2001 -0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.000)
∆Share youngi,2002−2001 -377.162 -333.537***
(366.944) (128.285)
∆Share oldi,2002−2001 424.271 -161.037
(333.013) (114.365)
∆Employed per capitai,2002−2001 55.290 7.811
(62.953) (19.177)
∆Short term debt per capitai,2002−2001 -0.011** -0.004**
(0.005) (0.002)
∆Core debt per capitai,2002−2001 -0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.001)
W × own imposed increase 0.456***
(0.033)
Constant -0.320 4.842***
(1.750) (0.668)
Kleibergen-Paap F 190.255
Adjusted R2 - 0.726
N 396 396
Notes: W assigns all municipalities in the same county as neighbors with equal
weights. Neighboring tax rates are instrumented with their predicted imposed
increase based on the year 2000. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Stars indicate significance levels at 1% (*), 5%(**) and 10%(***).
Our policy change-based instrument proves to be a relevant instrument in the first stage
in Model II. The Kleibergen-Paap F-test of about 190 in the first stage indicates the
strong predictive power of our instrumental variable. Moreover, the neighboring imposed
increase indicates the relevance of our instrument in statistical and economic means.22
These findings show that municipalities indeed respond strongly to the incentive caused
by the increase in the hypothetical tax rate as outlined in Section 3.3.
The second stage shows that the spatial interaction effect is positive and significant.
Therefore, municipalities seem to have reacted strategically to neighboring municipalities
in their own county regarding their tax rate choices after the reform. An increase in one
22An increase in one standard deviation (SD) of average neighboring tax imposed increase
results in an increase in 75 % of the SD of the neighboring average increase in the tax rates.
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SD of the neighbors tax increase results in a substantial increase in the own tax rate
by 20% (0.314 × 7.760)/12.822). Moreover, the influence of the predicted imposed tax
increase is 48.028 % of the SD.23 Both effects allow for an interesting comparison because
we can determine the degree of a direct response to the reform and to the response
of neighboring decisions. Since the effect of 'own imposed increase' is larger than the
neighboring interaction effect, we infer that politicians foremost respond to the policy
change. This is an interesting result, since tax mimicking is mainly driven by the reform
but is done only residually after adjusting ones' own tax rate to the policy change.
We also re-estimate our baseline model for various weighting matrices of both geograph-
ical and non-geographical nature. We present the most interesting results in Table 2
and a detailed overview of the results in Table A.2 in Appendix A. Interestingly, some
institutional weighting matrices are of significance, whereas the geographical weighting
matrices are not significant.24 This might indicate that institutional proximity is more
important for tax interactions in our setting than mere distance. Counties, adminis-
trations and functional media neighbor regions yield significant estimates and appear as
important networks for local tax interactions. However, functional administrative regions
do not show significant results. We attribute this to the large number of islands in this
weighting matrix. Also aggregated media regions are not significant but we believe that
the functional and more disaggregated media regions capture local variation in media
access better. Functional cooperation in individual projects yields slightly significant tax
interactions but, nevertheless, does not turn out to be robust against sensitivity checks.
Cooperation in regional tourism and interest groups for political and societal issues are
not significant either. Table A.3 in Appendix A shows the robustness of selected institu-
tional networks for local tax interactions. The disaggregated measure of common access
to local media yields robust results. Joint administrations also appear widely robust but
fail one placebo test in the pre-reform period.
We proceed with extensive robustness tests for the county matrix as our baseline weight-
ing scheme and discuss the implications of different institutional matrices in Section 5.4.
23Using the SD of the dummy 'Non-zero own imposed increase (1/0)' (46.64 %) and the SD
of own imposed increase (17.65), the effect on SD of the own tax increase is 48.03%. ((6.403 ×
0.4664) + ((17.647× 0.176)/12.687).
24Note that the confidence intervals of the institutional and geographical weighting matrices
partly overlap. Nevertheless, the coefficients of the significant institutional matrices are have
substantially larger interaction effects and model fit in terms of information criteria. For example,
comparing the best best performing institutional and geographical matrix, the county and binary
contiguity matrix, the interaction effect is 42% higher in the county matrix.
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Table 2: Institutional versus geographical weights
Model Weighting type ρ SE Kleibergen-Paap AIC BIC N
(I) Counties 0.314** (0.157) 190.255 2960.422 3000.236 396
(II) Administrative 0.271** (0.137) 1607.584 2968.263 3008.077 396
(III) Media functional 0.355*** (0.120) 1527.115 2966.355 3006.169 396
(IV) Cooperation functional 0.229* (0.124) 133.447 2969.105 3008.919 396
Notes : All presented matrices are row normalized. Control variables are the long differences of the
population, the share young (<15yrs.) and old (>65yrs.), employed per capita, core budget debt
per capita and short term debt per capita. Neighboring tax rates are instrumented with neighboring
predicted imposed increase based on the year 2000. Furthermore, we also include the own imposed
increase based on the year 2000 as well as a dummy whether own imposed increase is unequal to zero.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Stars indicate significance levels at 10% (*), 5%(**) and
10%(***).
5.3 Robustness tests
For the reform to be arguably exogenous, own tax decisions during the reform should
not be influenced by neighbors' tax decisions prior to the reform. We test this prediction
with several placebo tests in Table 3. In Model I-III we regress the predicted tax changes
of neighboring municipalities from 2002 to 2003 on tax changes in a municipality of years
preceding the reform. In Model IV, we assigned a municipality to an arbitrary county.
We do this by assigning a given municipality to all other municipalities in a county with
the next higher county identifier number. This ensures that each county is only assigned
once. Alternatively, we use historical county borders from 1960 as an additional placebo
test in Model V to show the exogeneity of county borders.25 County borders in West
German states changed in an extensive wave of county and municipal merger reforms in
the 1960s and 1970s. Hence, most county borders of today do not overlap with historical
borders. If tax interactions between municipalities were biased by spatial autocorrelation
of tax rates, tax rates should also be correlated across historical borders. If in fact today's
institutions mattered for current tax decisions, interactions should be insignificant.
Note that throughout all specifications and years our instrument proves to be a strong
predictor of neighboring tax rate changes. Regarding the robustness tests of Model
I-III, the interaction effect of current neighboring tax changes on past tax changes is
insignificant. This shows that our instrument significantly predicts the actual reform but
is not correlated via the error terms with earlier decisions. We also run placebo regressions
25The number of municipalities and counties decreased from 2365 to 396 and and from 57 to
30, respectively. There were more district-free cities, which results in 38 units without neighbors
in our sample. For simplicity, we assume them to be each others' neighbors. However, dropping
these observations does not change the results.
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Table 3: Robustness checks
Model ρ SE Kleibergen-Paap F N
(I) Tax changes 1994 - 1993 -0.081 (0.112) 194.389 396
(II) Tax changes 1995 - 1994 -0.018 (0.118) 204.934 396
(III) Tax changes 1996 - 1995 -0.054 (0.135) 198.969 396
(IV) W = Arbitrary county -0.045 (0.083) 493.748 396
(V) W = Counties 1960 0.173 (0.142) 127.085 396
Notes: W assigns all municipalities in the same county as neighbors with equal weights in Models I-III.
Model IV assigns municipalities form the county with the next higher county identifier as neighbors. Model
V assigns municipalities based on the same county prior to the county mergers in 1960. Neighboring tax
rates are instrumented in all models with their predicted imposed increase based on the year 2000. Control
variables are the same as in Table 1. Model I uses the first difference of the control variables from 1992 until
1993. Model II uses the first difference of the control variables from 1993 until 1994. Model III uses the first
difference of the control variables 1994 until 1995. Model IV and V use the first difference of the control
variables from 2001 until 2002. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Stars indicate significance levels
at 10% (*), 5%(**) and 10%(***).
where we gradually drop municipalities with more than 150,000 and 100,000 inhabitants.
Results do not change qualitatively and show that large municipalities do not drive the
effects of the reform. In addition, an insignificant interaction effect in Model IV indicates
that the municipal decision to increase tax rates solely depends on its own county. In
Model V we do not find significant effects which shows that not geographical proximity
but current institutions of the county matter for local tax interactions. Counties seem
to effectively coordinate contemporary tax policies at the local level.
We conduct further robustness checks in Table A.4 in Appendix A. Here, we omit control
variables, cluster on the county level, include different regional dummies to account for
regional heterogeneity and added accumulated contributions per county (Kreisumlage)
as a control. Since our coefficient of interest does not differ much when excluding control
variables in Model II, unobservable variation should not affect our variable of interest
and we have suggestive evidence that our instrument is in fact exogenous (Altonji, Elder,
and Taber, 2005).26 When clustering on the county level in Model III, the interaction
effect remains significant. The addition of regional variables in row IV and V and county
grants in row VI also do not change our findings qualitatively. Note that Model IV and
Model V show that our results are not only accrue to a metropolitan area (Holzmann
and Schwerin, 2015) or specific to a certain regional district, respectively. Moreover, we
can show that contributions to the county are insignificant in Model VI (not reported)
26Note that we keep the dummy's 'Non-zero own imposed tax increase' and 'Own increase'
in our set of control variables as we only introduce exogeneity with our IV conditional on own
incentives to increase the tax rates and avoid issues of spatial autocorrelation (Lyytikäinen, 2012).
When omitting these factors tax interactions become highly overestimated.
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and thus, we can rule out the presence of vertical externalities Revelli (2003).27
We also compare our results to traditional estimates of tax interactions. Traditional IV
estimates use neighbors characteristics as instruments for neighbors tax rates. Results
are displayed in Table A.5 in Appendix A. F-statistics are much lower compared to our
policy-change based instrument but are still nonweak by conventional standards. Both
traditional spatial lag models and QML estimations yield tax interactions of higher sig-
nificance and magnitude than our baseline model. In line with recent quasi-experimental
literature on local tax interactions, our findings cast some doubt on the validity of tra-
ditional instruments (Gibbons and Overman, 2012).
5.4 Discussion
5.4.1 Social learning and institutions
In Section 2 we argued that social learning is a likely motive for tax mimicking during
the reform in question. Here, we present suggestive evidence to support this notion.
Social learning is needed as individual municipalities or local politicians in particular are
unlikely to be successful in predicting the outcomes, for example future grant allocation,
as a result of the reform. This holds particularly for a reform of the complex grant
system of local fiscal equalization in NRW. Instead, local politicians and bureaucrats
need to communicate tax strategies to resolve the inherent uncertainty of the reform.
Moreover, social learning during the reform should be a one-step learning process rather
than a continuous process as new information has to be communicated only once. In
fact, we find supportive evidence for this in Table 4, where tax interactions become
insignificant two years after the reform and effects disappear gradually. The sharp drop
of the effect from 2007-2008 might reflect a federal reform of the business tax.28
27As a further exercise, we interacted tax interactions in different regressions with municipali-
ties under fiscal supervision and municipalities that do not receive rule grants (i.e. are abundant).
Tax interactions always remains significant but abundant and fiscally supervised municipalities,
respectively do not react to their neighbors during the reform. The results are available from
the authors upon request.
28Büttner, Scheer, and von Schwerin (2014) show that this reform induced municipalities
with many non-incorporated firms to increase their tax rates as a response of the new business
tax deductability to the income tax to be paid by those firms.
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The structure of tax interaction intensity provides another argument for social learn-
ing. Tax policies should be communicated on platforms where politicians or bureaucrats
are likely to meet such as the county parliament or joint administration offices. Also
local media might be an effective means of knowledge spillovers for tax policies. Other
institutional cooperations such as inter-municipal cooperation for individual projects, co-
operation in tourism or regional marketing or interaction with local interest groups are,
however, less reasonable channels of information for local tax policies. Accordingly, we
only find significant interactions within similar institutions and media as shown in Table
A.2 in Appendix A, but not for neighbors measured by geographical distance only. This
leads us to the conclusion, that we indeed observe social learning through the reform as
reform outcomes are hard to predict for individual municipalities and coordination via
counties, media and within bureaucracies is a feasible coping mechanism.
The absence of effects with geographical distance matrices shows that tax interactions
can be triggered by shared institutions or media rather than by geographical distance
only. Moreover, while counties, common administrations and media are valuable com-
munication platforms and intensify tax interactions during the reform, voluntary project
cooperation of municipalities is only slightly significant.29 Table A.2 in Appendix shows
that also local interest groups and cooperation in regional marketing and tourism do not
yield significant interactions. Table A.3 in Appendix shows the robustness of selected
weighting schemes. Administration and media weights prove to be widely robust and
show similar effects as the county weights. Single project cooperation, however, yields
only significance at the 10% level and depends largely on the inclusion of control variables.
Table 4: Long run results
Dependent Variable: ∆τi,t−2002
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
t = 2003 t = 2004 t = 2005 t = 2006 t = 2007 t = 2008
ρ 0.314** 0.345*** 0.204 0.195 0.165 0.047
(0.157) (0.134) (0.135) (0.131) (0.161) (0.169)
Kleibergen-Paap F 190.255 258.486 242.926 186.253 178.527 169.204
Control Variables ∆2002− 2001 ∆2003− 2001 ∆2004− 2001 ∆2005− 2001 ∆2006− 2001 ∆2007− 2001
N 396 396 396 396 396 396
Notes: W assigns all municipalities in the same county as neighbors with equal weights. All control variables are the same like in Table 1. Neighboring tax
rates are instrumented with their predicted imposed increase based on the year 2000. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Stars indicate significance
levels at 10% (*), 5%(**) and 10%(***).
29We regard the interaction effects of the inter-municipal cooperation scheme as a lower bound,
since not all cooperation's could be included in our cooperation variable (Terfrüchte, 2015).
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5.4.2 Evidence on competing explanations for tax interactions
We provide suggestive evidence in this section that social interactions and not other
competing motives are the reason for the observed tax mimicking instead.
Table 5 tests for the presence of yardstick competition as well as tax competition. Both
Model I and II interact local tax interactions with a measure of absolute majorities in the
local council which represents a standard test of the yardstick competition hypothesis
Allers and Elhorst (2005); Elhorst and Fréret (2009). Majorities in the local council
should decrease tax interactions if neighbor tax policies were effective yardsticks. Since
the interaction effects with the majority term are insignificant, we are able to rule out
yardstick competition as an explanation.
Moreover, Model III and IV test for tax base effects during the reform, i.e. the new
dependent variable is the tax base of a given municipality. If competition for mobile tax
bases was in place, one would observe significant effects in the respective models. Tax
base effects also do not seem to be present and therefore, tax competition is not an issue
in the present context. Also Baskaran (2015a) does not find significant tax revenue or
base effects of the reform in question. The timing of treatment effects is another reason
against tax competition. We only find short-term effects whereas tax competition for
mobile resources can be expected to trigger a continuous tax game. We also rule out
benefit spillovers as we do not observe any negative tax interactions.
Another explanation for local tax interactions is (partial) coordination. While we do
observe a strong role of counties in local policy making, active coordination through
counties is unlikely as this implies a perfect harmonization of tax rates within a given
county. However, business tax rates are still somewhat heterogeneous although they
were synchronized substantially after the reform. There is no anecdotal evidence either
that county executives dictate new tax rates for member communes. After all, counties
also do not have legal tax autonomy. Therefore, counties and other institutions can
be rather understood as a platform for local politicians or bureaucrats to communicate
individual tax strategies. The effect of media does not seem to be voter driven as there
are no differences between municipalities with or without narrow majorities. Therefore,
media could also work as a mere communication platform for politicians and bureaucrats
themselves to pick up information which are not spread in other ways such as county
parliaments, joint bureaucracies or other forms of inter-municipal cooperation. Therefore,
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not active but rather passive coordination in form of knowledge diffusion seems to be in
place.
Partial coordination is also unlikely to be present as it implies a repeated game structure
and one would therefore expect to observe continuous tax interactions. However, tax
interactions phase out quickly after the reform and have no effects on the tax base.
Table 5: Determination of interaction channels
Dependent Var: ∆i,2003−2002 tax rate ∆i,2003−2002 Taxbase per capita
subset: Majority > 50% subset: Majority > 55% W = County W = Binary contiguity
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
ρ 0.307* 0.346** -0.179 -0.145
(0.176) (0.167) (0.319) (0.268)
ρ× subset 0.010 -0.065
(0.080) (0.076)
Kleibergen-Paap F 93.856 93.025 189.555 141.540
N 396 396 396 396
Notes : W assigns all municipalities in the same county as neighbors with equal weights. Neighboring tax rates as
well as the interactions are instrumented with their predicted imposed increase based on the year 2000. All control
variables are the same like in Table 1. Majority always represents an interaction term with the neighboring tax rate,
when a party in the council has more than x percent of the seats in the municipal council. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses. Stars indicate significance levels at 10% (*), 5%(**) and 10%(***).
6 Conclusion
This paper exploits a quasi-experimental setting in local fiscal equalization in the German
state of NRW, to show the existence of local tax interactions for various weighting matri-
ces. Using instrumental variable techniques and detailed information on local networks,
we show that the reform in question triggered positive tax interactions immediately after
the reform only. Our results are robust to various specification tests, including several
placebo tests and random institution allocation.
Municipalities of the same county, those with the same bureaucrats or local media in-
teract most intensely with each other. Other platforms like project-wise inter-municipal
cooperation or interest group coverage do not intensify tax interactions. Hence, coun-
ties, joint administration and media are effective coordination mechanisms for local tax
policies during the reform in question. These are typically also networks where local
politicians and bureaucrats exchange information on salient political issues. We also
show that institutional rather than geographical proximity matters for tax interactions.
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These results are in line with the idea that municipalities engage in social learning in re-
form times. As reforms entail substantial political uncertainty, institutions like counties
or joint bureaucracies may offer a communication platform for local politicians and bu-
reaucrats to cope with uncertainty regarding future tax policy choices. Local media offer
similar coordination devices. Baskaran (2015b) finds similar evidence on social learning
in local tax choices between East German border municipalities with their West German
counterparts immediately after German reunification. Tax or yardstick competition and
benefit spillovers, however, do not seem to be drivers of the results.
Our results can be extended to other multi-tier federal contexts where federal and central
state legislation (vertically) influences local parameters of fiscal policy, for example other
German states (Büttner and von Schwerin, forthcoming), the US (Agrawal, 2015a), Eng-
land (Revelli, 2003) or France (Breuillé, Vigneron, and Anne-Laure, 2011). Büttner and
von Schwerin (forthcoming) show the importance of federal or state-wide institutional
tax rates (for e.g. the hypothetical tax rate) which represent reference rates for most
German states. NRW might be, however, a special case as municipal debt, tax rate levels
and the share of aggregate local to state expenditures are comparably high in the Ger-
man context (Arnold, Boettcher, Freier, Geißler, and Holler, 2015). Also its high average
municipal size compared to other German states may imply that NRW municipalities
are on average more professional in local policy making.
Future research might ask whether social learning via institutions is an efficient mecha-
nism to coordinate local responses during a fiscal macro shock. Also knowledge diffusion
through institutions or media for other local policies should be examined. Other policies
of high relevance that might need central coordination are for example the provision of
kindergarten places or the efficient allocation of refugees at the local level.
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A Appendix - Tables
Table A.1: Descriptive statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
2003
Business tax rate 412.058 23.150 310 490
Change business tax rate (1/0) .646 .479 0 1
Own imposed increase 16.475 17.648 0 103
Own imposed increase (1/0) 0.682 0.466 0 1
Population 45,655 86,863 4261 965,954
Share young 0.171 .018 .127 .238
Share old 0.174 .020 .115 .259
Employed per capita 0.252 .091 .052 .560
Rule-grants per capita 197.867 117.177 0 607.474
Total grants per capita 195.342 102.503 3.317 563.457
Short term debt per capita 147.289 315.416 0 2775.493
Core debt per capita 881.916 583.296 0 3739.515
∆2002− 2003
∆ Business tax rate 13.609 12.687 -2 70
∆ Population 8.412 637.410 -2685 8865
∆ Share young -0.003 0.002 -0.009 0.0008
∆ Share old 0.005 0.002 -0.002 0.011
∆ Employed per capita -0.006 0.008 -0.057 0.027
∆ Rule-grants per capita -14.531 56.392 -188.359 198.959
∆ Total grants per capita -56.265 56.019 -227.347 194.742
∆ Short term debt per capita 52.672 114.59 -181.78 638.62
∆ Core debt per capita 34.732 133.14 -1090.79 862.62
Source: Own calculations based on official statistics provided by the Federal Statistical Office.
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Table A.2: Comparison of action space based weighting matrices
Weighting type ρ Kleibergen-Paap AIC BIC Rank AIC & BIC
Institutional weighting matrices
Counties 0.314** 190.255 2960.422 3000.236 (1)
(0.157)
Administration 0.271** 1607.584 2968.263 3008.077 (14)
(0.137)
Media 0.119 2555.645 2973.952 3013.767 (21)
(0.141)
Social and economic 0.188 249.789 2966.875 3006.689 (8)
(0.154)
Regional marketing 0.227 1069.799 2970.831 3010.645 (19)
(0.142)
Cooperation 0.225 2247.738 2972.044 3011.858 (20)
(0.140)
Media functional 0.355*** 1527.115 2966.355 3006.169 (5)
(0.120)
Cooperation functional 0.229* 133.447 2969.105 3008.919
(0.124)
Social functional 0.218 189.078 2961.399 3001.213 (2)
(0.147)
Administration functional 0.114 235.091 2970.377 3010.191 (18)
(0.160)
Geographical weighting matrices
Binary Contiguity 0.221 140.628 2963.362 3003.176 (3)
(0.145)
Contiguity Second Order 0.209 404.886 2966.4 3006.214 (6)
(0.176)
5 nearest neighbors 0.119 151.059 2967.266 3007.08 (10)
(0.152)
10 nearest neighbors 0.221 240.567 2968.184 3007.998 (13)
(0.166)
15 nearest neighbors 0.188 413.748 2966.703 3006.517 (7)
(0.163)
20 nearest neighbors 0.191 556.770 2969.169 3008.984 (16)
(0.162)
25 nearest neighbors 0.195 872.759 2969.666 3009.48 (17)
(0.170)
Inverse Distance 15 km 0.201 158.857 2967.598 3007.412 (12)
(0.152)
Inverse Distance 20 km 0.257 227.420 2967.028 3006.843 (9)
(0.165)
Inverse Distance 25 km 0.250 353.036 2965.198 3005.012 (4)
(0.168)
Inverse Distance 30 km 0.245 617.861 2967.386 3007.2 (11)
(0.167)
Notes : All presented matrices are row normalized. Control variables are the same as in Table 1.
Neighboring tax rates are instrumented with their predicted imposed increase based on the year 2000.
All control variables are the same like in Table 1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Stars
indicate significance levels at 10% (*), 5%(**) and 10%(***).
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Table A.3: Robustness of relevant institutional weighting matrices
W = Administration W = Media functional W = Cooperation functional
Model ρ Kleibergen-Paap ρ Kleibergen-Paap ρ Kleibergen-Paap
Baseline 0.271** 1607.584 0.355*** 1527.115 0.229* 133.447
(0.137) (0.120) (0.124)
No covariates 0.241* 1562.300 0.327*** 1651.484 0.190 167.551
(0.138) (0.120) (0.124)
Placebo tests
Tax changes 1994 - 1993 0.044 1608.995 0.031 1642.932 -0.088 159.853
(0.098) (0.099) (0.081)
Tax changes 1995 - 1994 -0.200** 1611.568 -0.085 1707.909 -0.045 161.812
(0.094) (0.088) (0.088)
Tax changes 1996 - 1995 -0.130 1631.992 -0.161 1767.639 -0.041 162.615
(0.136) (0.110)
Long run results
Tax changes 2004 - 2002 0.251* 1634.552 0.351*** 1397.958 0.249** 124.360
(0.131) (0.115) (0.119)
Tax changes 2005 - 2002 0.141 1186.243 0.221* 983.390 0.163 222.830
(0.137) (0.119) (0.103)
Tax changes 2006 - 2002 0.174 819.592 0.240** 688.715 0.160 213.374
(0.139) (0.122) (0.107)
Tax changes 2007 - 2002 0.133 857.318 0.191 645.068 0.148 174.992
(0.148) (0.136) (0.116)
Tax changes 2008 - 2002 0.057 723.986 0.117 477.690 0.058 172.563
(0.164) (0.148) (0.121)
Notes : All presented matrices are row normalized. Control variables are the same as in Table 1. Neighboring tax
rates are instrumented with their predicted imposed increase based on the year 2000. All control variables are the
same like in Table 1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Stars indicate significance levels at 10% (*), 5%(**)
and 10%(***).
Table A.4: Robustness checks
Model ρ SE Kleibergen-Paap F N
(I) Baseline 0.314** (0.157) 190.255 396
(II) No covariates 0.297* (0.156) 201.232 396
(III) Clustering county 0.314** (0.137) 26.322 396
(IV) Ruhr region FE 0.287* (0.167) 177.150 396
(V) Nuts2 FE 0.287* (0.161) 208.064 396
(VI) Share county 0.310* (0.160) 188.643 396
Notes: W assigns all municipalities in the same county as neighbors with equal weights. Neighboring
tax rates are instrumented with their predicted imposed increase based on the year 2000. All control
variables are the same like in Table 1. Model II does not include control variables except the own
imposed increase and the respective dummy. Model III clusters standard errors at the county level.
Model IV includes a dummy that indicates the affiliation of the municipality to the Ruhr region.
Model V includes dummy's that indicate the respective NUTS2 region. Model VI include the first-
difference of the shared costs of the county from 2001 to 2002 (Kreisumlage) in the set of control
variables. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Stars indicate significance levels at 10% (*),
5%(**) and 10%(***).
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Table A.5: Traditional Spatial Econometric estimates
Traditional Spatial IV Quasi Maximum Likelihood
(I) (II)
∆τi,2003 − τi,2002 ∆τi,2003 − τi,2002
ρ 0.874*** 0.540***
(0.102) (0.056)
Kleibergen-Paap 71.962
Hansen J (p-val) 0.6575
N 396 396
Notes: W assigns all municipalities in the same county as neighbors with equal weights. Model
I uses the neighboring changes of all control variables as instrumental variables for neighboring
tax changes. Model II performs a quasi-maximum likelihood estimation on equ. (5) above. All
control variables are the same like in Table 1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Stars
indicate significance levels at 10% (*), 5%(**) and 10%(***).
B Appendix - Figures
Media functional Society functional
Cooperation functional Administration functional
Figure B.1: Institutional functional weighting matrices. Notes: Own coding and mapping
based on Terfrüchte (2015)
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Media Regionalmarketing
Society Administration
Cooperation
Figure B.2: Illustration of the institutional weighting matrices. Notes: Own coding and
mapping based on Blotevogel, Münter, and Terfrüchte (2009).
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Counties Counties 1960
Figure B.3: County weighting matrices
C Appendix - Data description
C.1 Description of the institutional weighting schemes
The county weights reflects the existing counties. All other weighting schemes are ob-
tained from Blotevogel, Münter, and Terfrüchte (2009) and Terfrüchte (2015). Blotevo-
gel, Münter, and Terfrüchte (2009) use a more heuristic approach that observes whether
different institutions within the same category share the same border. For each region,
the authors plotted the radii of each institution on a map and aggregated municipalities
to the regions, when they shared borders along these different institutions. Terfrüchte
(2015) uses a functional approach where regional correlations between the institutions are
used to construct regional action spaces. Whereas the approach by Blotevogel, Münter,
and Terfrüchte (2009) is more oriented on existing borders, the approach by Terfrüchte
(2015) is more functional. The first approach maps the borders of existing institutions
and aggregates these by common overlaps, whereas the second approach measures the
related regional correlation of institutions and constructs regions from these correlations.
These action spaces are the basis for our weighting matrices in Table A.2. In certain in-
stitutional setups, some municipalities end up as islands, i.e. do not have any neighbors.
For simplicity, we assign these municipalities a zero for neighboring tax changes.
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Table C.1: Definitions of non-geographical weighting matrices - institutional proximity and media
Weighting scheme Aggregated institutions Units (excl. islands) Mean links Islands
Administrative (functional) Labor court districts, bureau of standards districts, Chamber of agriculture. 15 (24) 35.22 (31.67) 0 (12)
land court districts, Bau- und Liegenschaftsbetrieb NRW, NUTS2 regions, regional
forestry commission office, public road construction, social court districts,
local rail transports, regional planning institutions and administrative court districts
Cooperation (functional) Voluntary local cooperation projects between municipalities 9 (75) 58.19 (8.24) 1 (5)
Media (functional) Local newspapers, local radios and local television 11 (22) 49.72 (33.34) 0 (0)
Social and economic (functional) Industrial chamber of commerce and chamber of crafts districts, regional associations 14 (47) 37.55 0 (5)
of political parties, districts of employers' associations and unions and districts
of environmental associations
Regional marketing Local tourist associations and regional marketing initiatives 14 43.01 0
Notes : Source: All institutional characteristics were obtained by Blotevogel, Münter, and Terfrüchte (2009). Institutional setups with the suffix functional are obtained
from Terfrüchte (2015).
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